# Workflow Contracts **Dispatch sync:** The scaffold `dispatch.yml` (at `internal/scaffold/fullsend-repo/.github/workflows/dispatch.yml`) and the repo's `reusable-dispatch.yml` (at `.github/workflows/reusable-dispatch.yml`) share identical routing logic for different installation modes (per-org vs per-repo). When changing the jq payload construction, stage routing, or input/secret threading in one, apply the same change to the other. The GitLab scaffold no longer uses a native `merge_request_event` dispatch path (see [#7322](https://github.com/fullsend-ai/fullsend/issues/7322)); the leftover `fullsend-dispatch.yml` stub was dropped in [#7707](https://github.com/fullsend-ai/fullsend/issues/7707) and the version marker now lives in `fullsend-pipeline.yml`. All GitLab events — including MR open, merge, and closed-unmerged — are discovered by the cron poller (`fullsend-poll.yml`) and dispatched as API-triggered pipelines on the protected default branch. Protected CI/CD variables are unavailable on unprotected MR refs, which is why native MR pipelines cannot run agent stages. When built-in harness triggers land (#2896-2901), poller routing can be replaced by `fullsend dispatch --input-driver json`. **Secret threading:** GHA reusable workflows do not inherit secrets — they must be explicitly forwarded by every caller. (Repository and organization-level `vars` are automatically visible inside called reusable workflows and do not need forwarding.) When any reusable workflow (`.github/workflows/reusable-*.yml`) adds a new `secrets:` or `inputs:` (`workflow_call`) entry, trace both installation-mode chains and ensure every hop forwards the new entry: - **Per-org chain** (deprecated per [ADR 44](../ADRs/0044-deprecate-per-org-installation-mode.md)): scaffold thin callers (`internal/scaffold/fullsend-repo/.github/workflows/.yml`) → reusable workflow (`.github/workflows/reusable-.yml`). Note: `dispatch.yml` also participates in this chain for routing and event-derived inputs (forwarded via `gh workflow run -f ...`), though not for secrets — thin callers pull secrets from their own repo/org context. This entire chain is scheduled for removal per ADR 44. - **Per-repo chain:** shim template → `reusable-dispatch.yml` (stage logic for triage/code/review/fix/retro/prioritize is inlined directly as jobs per [ADR 62](../ADRs/0062-dispatch-version-skew.md) — there is no separate `reusable-.yml` hop for per-repo mode; thread new secrets/inputs into the relevant inline job). Exception: `prioritize.yml` is installed per-repo as a thin caller that receives `workflow_dispatch` from the org-level scheduler and calls `reusable-prioritize.yml` directly, bypassing the dispatch shim. Standalone `reusable-.yml` files still exist but now serve only the per-org chain (and the prioritize thin caller exception) until it is removed per ADR 44. **Silent failures and required-flag consistency:** Omitting a secret that is `required: true` at every hop in the chain fails loudly at workflow-call validation time and self-enforces. However, a secret whose `required` flag is `false` at any upstream hop can still arrive as an empty string at a downstream `required: true` consumer — GitHub Actions' required-secret validation only checks key presence, not that the resolved value is non-empty. Per-repo GCP inputs are optional because an OpenAI-only repository does not use them; for the fleet harnesses' optional GCP mount, `fullsend run` rejects missing credentials before the pre-script on Vertex. Treat a missing forwarding hop as a correctness bug, not a cosmetic issue. **OWNERS-file authorization:** `has_repo_permission` in both `reusable-dispatch.yml` and the scaffold `dispatch.yml` supports an opt-in OWNERS-file path gated by `owners_file` in the `authorization` providers list in `.fullsend/config.yaml`. When enabled, the function checks the repo-root `OWNERS` (and `OWNERS_ALIASES` if present) before falling back to the collaborator API. Approvers get write-equivalent access; reviewers get triage-equivalent. Changes to `_owners_has_user` or the OWNERS authorization block must be applied to both workflow files — `TestDispatchPerStageAuthorization` checks `has_repo_permission` parity including OWNERS role-mapping invariants. The Go harness-dispatch path (`internal/harnessdispatch/core.go`) has equivalent OWNERS resolution via `internal/owners`; changes to the OWNERS schema or role mapping must be kept in sync across both implementations. **Security — consuming threaded inputs:** When a newly-threaded entry carries user- or event-controlled data, consume it via `env:` in the final `run:` step — never interpolate `${{ ... }}` directly into a shell block (see the Security note atop `reusable-dispatch.yml`). This prevents the GHA script-injection class of bugs the project defends against elsewhere. **When reviewing PRs:** If a diff adds or renames a `secrets:` or `inputs:` entry in a reusable workflow, check that all callers in both chains have been updated. Flag a missing forwarding hop as a medium-severity or higher finding. New secrets/inputs must be forwarded only to the hop(s)/stage(s) that need them — do not use `secrets: inherit` as a substitute for explicit forwarding (`OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_HEADERS`, for example, is explicitly forwarded to every inline stage job in `reusable-dispatch.yml` because each stage runs an agent that emits traces). `workflow_call_alignment_test.go` already automates much of this verification — see `TestWorkflowCallInputAlignment` (validates required inputs/secrets are threaded through both chains) and `TestOTELHeadersSecretThreading` (bespoke test for optional secrets). For new optional secrets/inputs, extend those tests or add a similar one rather than relying solely on manual tracing.